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Abstract
Eventual consensus is the only property of a rational dialog.
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A bayesian dialog 1 is a sequential exchange of beliefs; it is is the prototype
of a rational dialog. In the simple case of two individuals, at each stage, one
of the interlocutors states his beliefs formed after the revision prompted by
the beliefs stated by the other at the previous stage. The dialog terminates
when nothing is left to be said.
Following Plato 2, the dialog has been a literary genre of choice for the
transmission of knowledge; in practice, structured dialogs have been em-
ployed extensively to pool the information of experts 3, and more recently,
and ambitiously, in the search for consensus, even the resolution of conflict
and peacemaking. 4
Aumann (1976) defined common knowledge and proved that consensus is a
necessary condition for common knowledge. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1982) proved that bayesian dialogs terminate in consensus and common
knowledge 5.
I show that a third party, with access only to the transcript of a dialog,
cannot distinguish a bayesian dialog form an arbitrary sequence of alternating
utterances: the only property of a rational dialog is eventual consensus. The
argument extends to the special case of a didactic dialog, in which an expert is
better informed than his interlocutor. The expert never changes his opinion,
but the interlocutor follows an arbitrary path to agreement 6.
1Dialogs first appear in the Sumerian literary tablets, composed before the second
millennium b.c., much before the earliest Greek and Hebrew literary works, according to
Kramer (1963), who adds: “the disputations and dialogues, eleven in number, . . . are the
forerunners and prototypes of similarly literary compositions current all over the ancient
world as far as India on the east and probably Greece on the west, . . . and they provided
the literary and stylistic framework for even such profound philosophic works as Plato’s
dialogues.” Ho¨sle (2012) refers to the discussion between Uddaˆlaka Aˆruni and his son
S´vetaketu in the seventeenth chapter of the Chandoygya-Upanishad and to the Book of
Job.
2Ho¨sle (2012) states: “[T]he philosophical dialogue was not invented by the Greeks.
. . . [But,] despite the many dialogues in other cultures, we can maintain that the Greeks
succeeded in elevating the genre to new level. . . . Important metaphysical speculations were
also made in India – but not the comprehensive attempt to ground in reason, and solely in
reason, the norms that guide our conduct.”
3The Delphi method introduced in the beginning of the cold war, has been documented
and assessed in Dalkey (1969).
4On Dialogue, Wikipedia cites Laouris (2015) who reviews the employment of structured
dialogs in civil society dialog in Cyprus as well as the formulation of government and social
policy.
5Bacharach (1979) looked at bayesian dialogs when information is normally distributed.
6The dialogs of Plato are, indeed, didactic. Socrates, whose personality dominates
and with whom the author, Plato, identifies, knows the truth, to which he guides his
interlocutor; indeed, in the course of the dialogue, the knowledgeable expert, Socrates,
may lead the interlocutor, temporarily, to error. Unlike Plato, Hume (1779) does not take
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If, loosely speaking, one considers common knowledge and agreement
as an equilibrium and the dialog that leads to common knowledge as the
adjustment path, then it follows that, across fundamentals, equilibrium is a
refutable claim, while the rationality of the adjustment path is not. Which
bears an analogy with general competitive analysis: as follows from Debreu
(1974), the Walrasian taˆtonnement that leads to equilibrium, if it does, is
arbitrary; nevertheless, equilibrium prices and quantities are not arbitrary, in
Brown and Matzkin (1996), and, furthermore, in Chiappori, Ekeland, Kubler,
and Polemarchakis (2004), they identify the fundamentals.
Turing (1950) and, in a simpler form, Newman, Turing, Jefferson, and
Braithwaite (1952) posed the question whether automatic calculating ma-
chines can be said to think: The idea of the test is that the machine has to
pretend to be a man, by answering questions put to it, and it will only pass if
the pretense is reasonably convincing . . . . We had better suppose that each
jury has to judge quite a number of times, and that sometimes they really
are dealing with a man and not a machine. That will prevent them saying
‘It must be a machine’ every time without proper consideration.
Quine (1960) put forward the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation:
“manuals for translating one language into another, can be set up in different
ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible
with one another.” According to Kripke (1982), Quine bases his argument
from the outset on behavioristic premises and would never emphasize intro-
spective thought experiments, dialogs with one’s self, in the way Wittgenstein
does. Indeed, in Wittgenstein (1953), the paradox is this: “no course of ac-
tion could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be
made out to accord with the rule.
The argument here is relevant.
sides in the dialog between the sceptic, Philo, and Cleanthes who defends the argument
by design; at least not explicitly.
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1 The analytical argument
States of the world are
ω ∈ Ω =

Q1,1 . . . Q1,n . . . Q1,N
...
...
...
Qm,1 . . . Qm,n . . . Qm,N
...
...
...
Q1,M . . . QM,n . . . QM,N

,
a finite set, partitioned into a rectangular array of information cells.
Individuals receive information according to their information partitions.
The information sets of individual 1 are the rows of the array of information
cells,
Rm = (Qm,1, . . . , Qm,n, . . . Qm,N) ,
while the information sets of individual 2 are the columns,
Cn = (Q1,n, . . . , Qm,n, . . . QN,m)
T .
At a state of the world, ω ∈ Qm,n,
R(ω) = Rm, and C(ω) = Cn.
Events are sets of states of the world.
At ω, individuals 1 knows an event, E, if
R(ω) ⊂ E,
and, similarly, for individual 2.
Here,
R(ω) ∩ C(ω′) 6= ∅, ω, ω′ ∈ Ω,
and, as a consequence, the meet (the finest common coarsening) of the in-
formation partitions of individuals is {Ω, ∅} : the only event that is common
knowledge is Ω.
According to the prior beliefs common to individuals, information cells
occur with uniform probability,
pr(Qm,n) =
1
MN
;
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this circumvents conditioning on 0-probability and, otherwise, it is for sim-
plicity.
The prior conditional probability that the event A occurs is
pm,n = pr(A|Qm,n),
and the array of prior conditional probabilities is
P 0 =

p1,1 . . . p1,n . . . p1,N
...
...
...
pm,1 . . . pm,n . . . pm,N
...
...
...
p1,M . . . pM,n . . . pM,N

.
At a state of the world,
ω∗ ∈ Qm∗,n∗ ,
individuals 1 and 2 are informed of Rm∗ and Cn∗ , and they form posterior
beliefs pr(A|Rm∗) and pr(A|Cn∗), respectively.
The argument in Aumann (1976), that posteriors that are common knowl-
edge coincide, is, here, evident. Since the only event that is common knowl-
edge is Ω, the posterior beliefs are common knowledge, only if
pr(A|R(ω)) = pr(A|Rm∗), ω ∈ Ω,
and, as a consequence
pr(A|Rm∗) = pr(A| ∪ω R(ω)) = pr(A).
By a similar argument,
pr(A|Cn∗) = pr(A| ∪ω C(ω)) = pr(A),
and
pr(A|Rm∗) = pr(A|Cn∗).
Importantly, for an arbitrary event, A, posteriors need not be common
knowledge, and a dialog can commence 7.
7The posteriors, pr(A|Rm∗) = pr(A|Cn∗), may well coincide but not be common knowl-
edge.
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The dialog between individual 1 and individual 2 concerns the probability
that ω∗ ∈ A : the event A has occurred.
A dialog is a finite sequence of utterances,
(q1, q2, . . . , qt, . . . , qT ), 0 ≤ qt ≤ 1,
at t odd by individual 1, and at t even by individual 2.
A bayesian dialog is defined inductively.
The individual who speaks, at t, bases his beliefs on information available
to him at the end of the preceding round of communication, and qt is the
probability that the individual who speaks at t attaches to the occurrence of
the event A.
After a permutation of rows and columns 8, ω∗ = ω1,1.
At t = 1, individual 1 announces his posterior beliefs,
q1 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
p1,n
9.
After a further permutation of rows,
1
N
N∑
n=1
pm,n =
1
N
N∑
n=1
p1,n ⇔ m = 1, . . . ,M1 ≤M,
and the announcement of q1 by individual 1 reveals that
ω∗ ∈ ∪M1m=1 ∪Nn=1 Qm,n.
After individual 1 has spoken at t = 1, is the revised array of conditional
probabilities of the event A
P 1 =

p∗1,1 . . . p1,N
...
...
...
pM1,1 . . . pM1,N
 .
Note that pr(A|R1m) = q1, for m = 1, . . . ,M1.
8Successive permutations of rows and columns allow for simpler exposition; column R1
and the row C1 are not involved in permutations after the initial permutation that places
(m∗, n∗) at (1, 1).
9q1 = pr(A| ∪Nn=1 Q1,n) =
∑N
n=1 pr(A|Q1,n)pr(Q1,n| ∪Nn′=1 Q1,n′) = (1/N)
∑N
n=1 p1,n.
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At t = 2, individual 2 announces his posterior beliefs
q2 =
1
M1
M1∑
m=1
pm,1
10.
After a permutation of columns,
1
M1
M1∑
m=1
pm,n =
1
M1
M1∑
m=1
pm,1 ⇔ n = 1, . . . , N2 ≤ N,
and the announcement of q2 by individual 2 reveals that
ω∗ ∈ ∪M1m=1 ∪N
2
n=1 Qm,n.
After individual 2 has spoken at t = 2, the revised array of prior conditional
probabilities of the event A is
P 2 =

p∗1,1 . . . p1,N2
...
...
...
pM1,1 . . . pM1,N2
 .
Here, pr(A|C2n) = q2, for n = 1, . . . , N2.
At stage t = 3, 5, . . . , (2τ + 1), . . . , individual 1 announces his posterior
probability on the event A,
qt =
1
N t−1
Nt−1∑
n=1
p1,n
11.
After a permutation of rows,
1
N t−1
Nt−1∑
n=1
pm,n =
1
N t−1
Nt−1∑
n=1
p1,n ⇔ m = 1, . . . ,M t ≤M t−1,
and the announcement of qt by individual 1 reveals that
ω∗ ∈ ∪Mtm=1 ∪N
t−1
n=1 Qm,n.
10q2 = pr(A| ∪M1m=1 Qm,1) = (1/M1)
∑M1
m=1 pm,1.
11qt = pr(A| ∪Nt−1n=1 Q1,n) = (1/N t−1)
∑Nt−1
n=1 p1,n, for t = 3, 5, . . . , (2τ + 1), . . . .
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The revised array of prior conditional probabilities of the event A is
P t =

p∗1,1 . . . p1,Nt−1
...
...
...
pMt,1 . . . pMt,Nt−1
 , t = 3, 5, . . . , (2τ + 1), . . . .
Note that pr(A|Rtm) = qt, m = 1, . . . ,M t.
At stage t = 4, 6, . . . , 2τ, . . . , individual 2 announces his posterior proba-
bility on the event A,
qt =
1
M t−1
Mt−1∑
m=1
pm,1
12.
The announcement of qt by individual 2 reveals that
ω∗ ∈ ∪Mt−1m=1 ∪N
t
n=1 Qm,n.
The revised array of prior conditional probabilities of the event A is
P t =

p∗1,1 . . . p1,Nt
...
...
...
pMt−1,1 . . . pMt−1,Nt
 , t = 4, 6, . . . , 2τ, . . . .
Here, pr(A|Ctn) = qt, n = 1, . . . , N t.
The argument in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), that the ex-
change and revision of posteriors terminates in consensus is, here, evident.
Suppose that at some stage, t, (odd), player 1 does not reveal any informa-
tion by the announcement of qt; that is, M t = M t−1, and P t = P t−1. Since
pr(A|Rtm) = pr(A|Rt−1m ) = qt, m = 1, . . .M t = M t−1, while pr(A|Ctn) =
pr(A|Ct−1n ) = qt−1, n = 1, . . . N t = N t−1, the posterior beliefs of the two in-
dividuals are common knowledge, and they coincide. Evidently, since the di-
mensions of the array of prior conditional beliefs, P 0, are finite, convergences
in finitely many rounds of communication is necessary; and the number of
rounds is bounded by M, the cardinality of the collection of information sets
of individual 1.
If, in the course of a dialog, qt = 0 or 1, the belief becomes immediately
common knowledge and there is consensus. We restrict attention to dialogs
with
0 < qt < 1.
12qt = pr(A| ∪Mt−1m=1 (Qm,1 ∩Q1)) = (1/M t−1)
∑
n pm,1, for t = 4, 6, . . . , 2τ, . . . .
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Proposition. Any dialog, (q1, q2, . . . , qt, qt+1, . . . , qT−1, qT ), that terminates
in consensus: qT−1 = qT is a bayesian dialog.
Proof: We argue by induction.
Consider an arbitrary dialog of length T = 3 that terminates in consensus:
(q1, q2, q3), with q2 = q3.
For
P 2 = P 3 = (p1,1),
with p1,1 = q
2 = q3, the dialogue terminates in consensus and common
knowledge 13.
Let
P 1 = (p1,1, p1,2, p1,3, . . . , p1,k, . . . , p1,2+K),
with 2 +K = N3 = N and
p1,1 = q
2 = q3,
p1,2 = ε, 0 < ε < 1, and
p1,k =
1
K
[(K + 2)q1 − q2 − ε], k = 3, . . . , 2 +K.
For K large, 0 < p1,k < 1, while a local variation in ε guarantees that
p1,k 6= p1,1, k = 2, . . . , 2 +K.
At t = 1, individual 1, informed of R1, announces
q1 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
p1,k =
1
N
[q2 + ε+ (Nq1 − q2 − ε)].
AT t = 2, individual 2, informed of C11 , announces q
2 = p1,1. Since, by
construction, p1,k 6= p1,1, k = 2, . . . 2+K, the state of information that results
is, indeed, P 2 = (p1,1); as a consequence, P
2 = P 3, and the dialog terminates
with consensus: q3 = q2 that is common knowledge.
The array of prior conditional probabilities P 0 = P 1 generates the dialog
(q1, q2, q3).
For a dialog of length T that terminates in consensus (q1, q2, . . . , qt, . . . ,
qT−1, qT ), with qT−1 = qT , suppose that, for some t that is even, and after
13Here, after the dialog terminates, the information available to individuals coincides
with their pooled information; this is not a necessary for a rational dialog.
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individual 2 has spoken, the array of conditional probabilities
P t =

p1,1 . . . p1,Nt
...
...
...
pMt−1,1 . . . pMt−1,Nt

generates the dialog (qt, qt+1, . . . , qT−1, qT ). In particular,
qt =
1
M t−1
Mt−1∑
m=1
pm,1 =
1
M t−1
Mt−1∑
m=1
pm,n, n = 1, . . . , N
t.
Construct the augmented array of conditional probabilities
P t−1 =
p1,1 . . . p1,Nt p1,Nt+1 . . . p1,Nt+k . . . p1,Nt−2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
pMt−1,1 . . . pMt−1,Nt pMt−1,Nt+1 . . . pMt−1,Nt+k . . . pMt−1,Nt−2

with
N t−2 = N t + 1 +M t−1K, K > 0,
pm,Nt+1 = εm,
1
Mt−1
∑Mt−1
m=1 εm 6= qt, 0 < εm < 1, and
pm,Nt+k =

1
K
[N t−2qt−1 − εm −
∑Nt
n=1 pn,k],
N t + 1 + (m− 1)K ≤ k ≤ N t + 1 +mK,
0, otherwise,
,
for m = 1, . . .M t−1.
For K large, 0 < pm,Nt+k < 1, while a local variation in εm guarantees
that pm,Nt+k 6= M t−1qt, k = 2, . . . , 2 +K, m = 1, . . .M t−1.
At t− 1,individual 1, informed of Rt−21 = Rt−21 announces
qt−1 =
1
N t−2
Nt−2∑
n=1
p1,n =
1
N
[
Nt∑
n=1
pm,n + εm + (N
t−2qt−1 − εm −
Nt∑
n=1
pm,n)].
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AT t, individual 2, informed of Ct−11 , announces q
t. Since, by construction,
pm,Nt+k 6= qt, k = 2, . . . , 2 + K, m = 1, . . .M t−1., the state of information
that results is, indeed, P t. The array of conditional probabilities P t−1 gener-
ates the dialog (qt−1, qt, . . . , qT−1, qT ). Successive repetition of this argument
generates an array of conditional probabilities, P 0 = P 1, that generates the
dialog (q1, q2, . . . , qt, . . . qT−1, qT ). 
The constructive argument above can generate curious dialogs.
Example. We give here the first few steps for the construction of a state space
and conditional probabilities that generate a dialog of arbitrary length of the
form
(
1
4
, . . . ,
1
4
, . . . ,
1
4
,
3
4
,
3
4
) :(
3
4
∗ ) → ( 3
4
, 3
4
)
,
(
3
4
∗ 1
12
1
12
1
12
) → ( 1
4
, 3
4
, 3
4
)
,

3
4
∗ 1
12
1
12
1
12
0 0 0 0
1
8
11
24
11
24
11
24
1
8
11
24
11
24
11
24

→ ( 1
4
, 1
4
, 3
4
, 3
4
)
Experts At a state of the world, ω∗ = 1, an individual, 1, is an expert
concerning the event A if
pr(A|R1) = pr(A|Q1,n), n = 1, . . . N :
no information in the join (coarsest refinement of the partitions of the indi-
viduals) would cause him to alter his beliefs.
A dialog with an expert is a dialog
(q¯, q2, . . . , q¯, q2t, . . . , q¯), 0 ≤ q¯, qT ≤ 1,
at t odd, q2t+1 = q¯, by individual 1, and at t even, q2t, by individual 2.
Corollary. Any dialog, with an expert, (q¯, q2, . . . , q¯, q2t, . . . , q¯, q¯), that termi-
nates in consensus is a bayesian dialog with an expert.
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Proof. It suffices to set pi,n = q¯ for all n, and apply the construction in the
proposition starting with m ≥ 2.
Order matters Consider the array of conditional probabilities 1∗ 0 0
0 1 a
 , a 6= 0, 1.
Informed of R1 = R(ω
∗), individual 1 announces q1 = 1/3.
With a 6= 0, this reveals his information set to individual 2, who now
knows that ω ∈ Q1,1 and announces q2 = 1.
In turn, this prompt individual 1 to revise his posterior to q3 = 1.
Alternatively, individual 2 speaks first. Informed of C1 = C(ω
∗), he
announces q1 = 1/2.
With a 6= 1, this allows individual 1 to deduce that C(ω∗) ∈ {C1, C2},
that is, C(ω∗) 6= C3, and, as a consequence, announce q2 = 1/2.
The announcement of individual 2 revels no information; the beliefs of
individuals are common knowledge, and they coincide.
But, this common posterior belief that assigns probability 1/2 to the
event, reflects information less precise than the information the individuals
would have access to at the end of a dialog initiated by individual 1.
Silence The formulation here a dialog is an alternating sequence of utter-
ances; formally, an interlocutor cannot remain silent when it is his turn to
speak. One can interpret silence by an interlocutor at t as the repetition of
his utterance at t− 2 : that is, qt = qt−2. It is important, nevertheless, that
different rounds of responses be distinct, which may not be the case if both
interlocutors remain silent.
Public information may obfuscate Consider the arrays of prior and
conditional probabilities
1
6
1
6
0
1
6
1
6
1
6
0 1
6
0
 and

1∗ 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
 .
Informed of R1 = R(ω
∗), individual 1 announces q1 = 1/2.
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This reveals his information set to individual 2, who now knows that
ω ∈ Q1,1 and announces q2 = 1.
In turn, this prompt individual 1 to revise his posterior to q3 = 1.
The dialog ends in consensus and common knowledge.
Importantly, the common knowledge information available to individuals
coincides with the information pooling would have led them to since R1∩C1 =
Q1,1.
Suppose now that, following the realisation of ω∗ a public authority, policy
maker announces that
ω∗ 6∈ {Q1,3 ∪Q2,3}.
Note that this is something both individuals know; of course, it is not
common knowledge, and, as a consequence, it affects the exchange of infor-
mation between the individuals.
With the truncated array of conditional probabilities 1 0
0 1
 ,
the posterior beliefs of the individuals are common knowledge and there is
no information to exchange.
The point, as in Dutta and Polemarchakis (2012) is that this common
posterior belief that assigns probability 1/2 reflects information that is less
precise than the information the individuals would have access to by exchang-
ing beliefs, through a dialog, without the prior public announcement.
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